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FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE GREAT
RECESSION:
ON THE FAILURE OF REGULATION IN THE MORTGAGE
MARKET
Dov Solomon*
People tend to attribute the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis to deregulation.
This article challenges this view and presents a unique perspective of the crisis as in
fact rooted in the way the residential mortgage market is regulated. Focusing on nonrecourse mortgage legislation, which is a unique feature of the US mortgage market
dating back to the period following the Great Depression, the article analyzes the
contribution of this legislation to the onset of the Great Recession. The discussion
shows how regulation that was enacted in response to a major economic crisis not
only failed to prevent a large-scale future crisis but also created the conditions for
its eventual emergence.
Non-recourse laws prevent lenders from seeking a deficiency judgment after
foreclosure and impose no personal liability on borrowers in the event of default.
They distort risk allocation in the mortgage market as they allow borrowers to externalize the risk of default to third parties. These laws thus create incentives for excessive borrowing, which ultimately resulted in the housing boom and bust of the 2000s.
The analysis in this article has important implications for current reforms in leading
foreclosure states, such as California and Nevada, where regulators recently expanded the scope of the existing mandatory non-recourse legislation. The insights
from the article regarding non-recourse mortgages should serve as a warning to regulators against adopting such legislation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2008 global financial crisis, triggered by the mortgage meltdown in the
United States, offers surprising insight into the regulation of the mortgage market.
Contrary to the common view that the crisis was rooted in deregulation,1 this article

*
Assistant Professor, College of Law and Business, Ramat Gan Law School. PhD, MBA & LLB, BarIlan University. I would like to thank the participants in the Commercial Law Workshop at the College of Law
and Business for helpful comments. I am grateful to Derora Tropp for excellent research assistance.
1. For example, President Obama blamed deregulation for causing the 2008 financial crisis. THE WHITE
HOUSE, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE ECONOMY, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/14/remarks-president-economy-cleveland-oh (last updated June 14, 2012):
Without strong enough regulations, families were enticed, and sometimes tricked, into buying homes
they couldn’t afford. Banks and investors were allowed to package and sell risky mortgages. Huge,
reckless bets were made with other people’s money on the line. And too many from Wall Street to
Washington simply looked the other way.
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argues that it was in fact the way the market was regulated in response to the Great
Depression that created the conditions for the Great Recession. The article expands
on this historical perspective through an in-depth examination of the legislation relating to non-recourse mortgages, which was enacted following the Great Depression.
This analysis reveals the central role played by the non-recourse legislation in the
housing boom and bust of the 2000s and concludes with some important insights on
regulation in general and regulation of the mortgage market in particular.
Non-recourse loans are a unique characteristic of the US mortgage market2 and
first emerged in state legislation in the 1930s. A decrease in demand for real estate
and the ensuing precipitous drop in prices during the Great Depression led to the
realization of mortgages at minimal prices, significantly below their outstanding balances. As a result, not only did borrowers lose the roofs over their heads to lenders
but also faced lawsuits by the same lenders for the significant remainder of their debt.
This harsh reality caused many states to adopt borrower-friendly legislation.3 Specifically, these laws limited the lender’s recourse, prohibiting him from suing the borrower personally for the difference between the foreclosure sale price and the outstanding balance of the debt.4 The legislation thus essentially imposed a non-recourse
arrangement on the parties to the mortgage transaction.5 In effect it gave the borrower
a put option, allowing her to terminate the remainder of the debt in exchange for
transferring the mortgaged property to the lender.6
In the 1990s, the effect of this lack of personal liability for borrowers in a nonrecourse mortgage was compounded by the relaxation of credit standards. Unlike the
traditional requirement for a minimum down payment of 20% of the collateralized
property’s total value, loan-to-value (LTV) ratios grew in the years preceding the
mortgage crisis.7 Lenders’ willingness to give loans to borrowers without a significant down payment is commonly attributed to the expansion of the securitization
market, which allowed lenders to transfer the risks associated with default to third
parties.8 Furthermore, in many cases, homebuyers could avoid investing personal
See also Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/business/economy/04fed.html (“Regulatory failure, not low
interest rates, was responsible for the housing bubble and subsequent financial crisis of the last decade.”).
2. See The Economic Stimulus and Sustained Economic Growth: Hearing Before the H. Democratic
Steering & Policy Comm., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Martin Feldstein), available at
http://www.nber.org/feldstein/EconomicStimulusandEconomicGrowthStatement.html (“[M]ortgages loans are
generally non-recourse loans . . . This ‘no recourse’ character of mortgages is unique to the United States.”).
3. See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489
(1991) (analyzing borrower-friendly legislation).
4. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.3 (5th ed. 2007).
5. James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different View of Mortgage Anti-Deficiency
and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 124 n.41 (1997).
6. An option is a legal right granted by one party to the other to buy or sell something at a fixed price
and within a specified period. An option that grants the right to buy is called a call option, while an option that
grants the right to sell is called a put option.
7. See Joshua Rosner, Housing in the New Millennium: A Home Without Equity Is Just a Rental with
Debt (2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162456.
8. See, e.g., Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating Mortgage Foreclosures:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 74 (2007) (statement of Ben Bernanke, US Federal
Reserve Chairman); see also Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from
Subprime Loans (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137; Luc
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funds by taking credit insurance for housing loans with high LTV ratios9 or second
mortgages.10 Indeed, data on the US mortgage market show that on the eve of the
mortgage crisis, approximately half of all borrowers had not been required to put
down any money before receiving their housing loans.11
States that have since adopted non-recourse mortgage legislation, such as California and Arizona, were at the center of the outbreak of the mortgage meltdown.12
Non-recourse loans combined with no down payment requirement created a distortion of risk allocation in the mortgage market. The lack of an ex-ante requirement to
invest personal equity upfront and an ex-post requirement holding the borrower personally responsible for repayment created a moral hazard.13 It incentivized borrowers
to take out loans regardless of whether they would be able to repay them, fully aware
that they were externalizing the risk of default to third parties.14 Thus, the availability
of full financing alongside no personal obligation for repayment led to excessive borrowing and the resulting real estate bubble.15
When the real estate market crashed, however, this bubble burst and the value of
the collateralized assets plummeted to below the value of the balance of the mortgages.16 Since equity in an asset is defined as the surplus of value over debt, this

A. Laeven et al., Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market 1 (IMF
Working Paper No. 08/106, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153728; Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi,
The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis (2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304.
9. Credit insurance policies for housing loans with LTV ratios greater than 80% are supplied both by
federal assistance frameworks (for eligible parties) and by the private sector. Insurance will be triggered in the
event of foreclosure and protects the lender from losses due to a decline in the value of the collateralized property.
10. Second mortgages are given at higher interest rates since they reflect the risks resulting from allowing
financing beyond the traditional threshold of 80% and that the lien in favor of the second lender is subordinate
to the first lender. In popular parlance, these second mortgages are known as “piggybacks.”
11. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
12. See Arizona, California Markets Lead Top Ten List for Home Sales, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
(Oct. 27, 2009, 10:45 AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Real-Estate/2009/10/27/Arizona-CaliforniaMarkets-Lead-Top-Ten-List-for-Home-Sales/3731256654866/.
13. Situations in which the party that creates the risk stands to gain but does not bear the potential loss are
referred to as a moral hazard. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV.
237 (1996); CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION, MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985).
14. John Harding, Thomas J. Micelli & C.F. Sirmans, Do Owners Take Better Care of Their Housing
Than Renters?, 28 REAL ESTATE ECON. 663 (2000); Ankoor Jain & Cally Jordan, Diversity and Resilience:
Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 32 U.N.S.W.L.J. 416, 440 (2009); Schill, supra note 3, at 534.
15. See Christopher J. Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults 23 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ.
Discussion
Series,
Paper
No.
2008-59,
2008),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/FEDS/2008/200859/200859pap.pdf (arguing that as the standards for granting loans relaxed,
the availability of loans for housing purchases increased along with the demand for housing and housing prices);
Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Underpriced Lending and Real Estate Markets (2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980298 (arguing that the accessibility of loans to borrowers increased the demand for
housing and that this caused housing prices to rise more steeply than the real value of the assets).
16. Housing prices rose at a yearly average of 11% between 2000 and 2005. Following a brief period of
stability, the prices began to drop at an average rate of 10% from mid-2006 to mid-2008. Mayer et al., supra
note 15, at 21.
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created a negative equity situation.17 When the negative equity was significant, rational borrowers preferred to stop repaying their loans, walk away from their homes,
and be freed of their debt.18 This was possible because the loans were non-recourse
mortgages. Known as strategic default, this phenomenon characterized the US real
estate market during the mortgage meltdown.in March Guiso et al. found that 19
2009, 26.4% of defaults on mortgages were strategic, and by September 2010, this
figure had risen to 35.1%.20 The massive abandonment of property had a snowball
effect, leading to rapidly deteriorating prices in the market and further escalating the
meltdown.21
Analyzing the non-recourse mortgage model and its contribution to the outbreak
of the mortgage crisis is crucial for understanding the risks of the recent regulatory
reforms in the US mortgage market in leading foreclosure states, such as California
and Nevada.22 Following the mortgage meltdown, state regulators in these states expanded the scope of their mandatory non-recourse legislation.23 The insights from
the analysis of the incentive distortions created by non-recourse legislation and its
long-term costs should serve to warn state regulators against adopting such legislation.
The discussion proceeds as follows: Part II identifies the inherent flaws of hasty
regulatory responses to economic crises. Part III then presents the non-recourse
model adopted by certain states in the US following the Great Depression to contend
17. Negative equity situation is often referred to colloquially as being “underwater,” as the level of outstanding debt is conceived of as a kind of “waterline” and the market value of the property as the height it
attains.
18. The growing phenomenon of borrowers who leave their homes when the value of the asset is less than
the balance of the debt has been the subject of extensive media coverage. See, e.g., Nicole Gelinas, The Rise of
the
Mortgage
“Walkers,”
WALL
ST.
J.,
Feb.
8,
2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120243369715152501.html?mod=rss_Today’s_Most_Popular; Barbara Kiviat, Walking Away From
Your Mortgage, TIME, June 19, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1816472,00.html;
Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, One in Four Borrowers Is Underwater, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB125903489722661849-lMyQjAxMDI5NTI5NDAyMzQ0Wj.html; David Streitfeld, When Debtors Decide to Default, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/weekinreview/26streitfeld.html.
19. See Brent T. White, Take This House and Shove It: The Emotional Drivers of Strategic Default, 63
SMU. L. REV. 1279 (2010) (interviewing more than 350 individuals who, by their own admission, have either
already strategically defaulted on their mortgages or are considering doing so in an attempt to map the reasons
for strategic defaults).
20. Luigi Guiso et al., The Determinants of Attitudes toward Strategic Default on Mortgages, 68 J. FIN.
1473, 1490 (2013).
21. It is important to note that the wide scope of default was not necessarily connected solely with subprime mortgages—that is, high-interest-rate loans sold to riskier borrowers—and in fact characterized the entire
US mortgage market. See Stan Liebowitz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis: Zero Money Down, Not
Subprime Loans, Led to the Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124657539489189043.html (“[T]he focus on subprimes ignores the widely available industry facts (reported by the Mortgage Bankers Association) that 51% of all foreclosed homes had prime loans, not subprime,
and that the foreclosure rate for prime loans grew by 488% compared to a growth rate of 200% for subprime
foreclosures.”).
22. See, e.g., 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 64 (S.B. 1069 amending CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580b); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 40.455 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.458 (2011).
23. Following the mortgage crisis, California, which considered a non-recourse state even before the crisis, expanded the protection to borrowers further, whereas Nevada shifted directly from a recourse regime to a
non-recourse regime. See infra Part VII.
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with the massive home foreclosures during that period. Part IV analyzes the unique
risk allocation with non-recourse loans, which is directly impacted by fluctuations in
the market price of the asset serving as collateral. This allocation of the risk creates
an ex-ante incentive for excessive borrowing and an ex-post incentive for strategic
default when there is negative equity in the property. Part V analyzes the trend of
lenient down payment requirements for housing loans that characterized the US mortgage market in the years leading up to the mortgage meltdown and considers the
central role of securitization in this process. Part VI explains how non-recourse loans
combined with no down payment requirements in the mortgage market contributed
to the housing boom and bust. In Part VII, recent regulatory reforms broadening the
scope of non-recourse mortgages are analyzed. Part VIII concludes the article and
points to the lessons that can be learned from its analysis.

II. REGULATION IN THE WAKE OF CRISIS
In times of economic crisis, regulatory agencies tend to respond with swift and
extensive reform.24 Their goal is to quell the public outrage and rebuild trust in the
regulatory agencies and stability of the markets. This is seen as essential for halting
escalation of the crisis at hand and preventing similar crises in the future. A cynical
view of this recurring pattern would be that this is directed more at creating the impression of a serious response than at actually yielding such a response. The focus, it
could be said, is on the positive short-term impact rather than on positive long-term
changes.25
A prominent example of this pattern of rapid regulation was the response to financial scandals exposed in US corporations between the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. In late 2001, the energy giant Enron, the seventh largest company in the US at the time, suddenly collapsed.26 This was the result of the exposure
of complex accounting fraud, misrepresentation of earnings, and deliberate omission
of liabilities from the company’s balance sheet. When Enron became insolvent, thousands of employees lost their jobs. In addition, investors in the capital markets suffered immense damage from the collapse of Enron and other corporations, such as
Worldcom, in which financial irregularities were discovered.27 Regulatory agencies
wasted no time in taking action to restore investor confidence. The 2002 SarbanesOxley Act (“SOX”) was passed with the aim of strengthening supervision and internal control over financial reporting of public companies.28 President George W. Bush
24. Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
849, 850 (1997) (“[M]ost of the major instances of new securities regulation in the past three hundred years of
English and American history have come right after crashes.”); Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in
the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (2002); Frank Partnoy, Why
Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741, 743 & n.11 (2000).
25. P.N. Grabosky, Counterproductive Regulation, 23 INT’L J. SOC. L. 347, 356 (1995).
26. LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL (2003).
27. For a description of the worst financial scandals exposed in the US at the end of the second millennium
and beginning of the third, see A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923-36 (2003).
28. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
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called SOX “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt” and the New Deal.29
A second recent instance of hurried regulatory response was the action taken to
contend with the global financial crisis of 2008. This crisis, which had originated in
the US mortgage market, snowballed and spread into many other markets, in part
because of mortgage securitization and active trade in mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs).30 Again, regulatory agencies took rapid steps to calm the public uproar and
restore confidence in the stability of the markets. In July 2010, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Act, designed to enforce comprehensive financial reform in public companies.31
This pattern of hasty regulatory activity raises the concern that legislation is
passed without sufficient scrutiny. The risk is that there is not enough time to take
into account all of the factors that caused the crisis in question and to evaluate alternative possible measures for dealing effectively with them.32 Moreover, following
any financial crisis, regulatory agencies face harsh media criticism and intense public
pressure to come up with solutions. This could lead to the enactment of legislation
whose main purpose is to calm public anger, even though it may not be the most
appropriate measure for addressing the economic exigencies.33 Pressure to pass legislation that will prevent future crises can lead to an overestimation of the benefits
and underestimation of the costs of the new measure.34
The legislative initiatives that followed financial crises have been harshly criticized in the academic literature. Roberta Romano, for example, calls the SOX reforms ineffective quack corporate governance.35 She contends that most of the corporate governance rules introduced by SOX were not new initiatives designed to deal

18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
29. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at
C5, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/business/corporate-conduct-the-president-bush-signs-bill-aimed-atfraud-in-corporations.html.
30. For the central role played by securitization of mortgages in the financial crisis, see, e.g., John D.
Martin, A Primer on the Role of Securitization in the Credit Market Crisis of 2007, in LESSONS FROM THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 199 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2010);
TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNSEL, MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RISK RETENTION REQUIREMENTS 10-14 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/Section%20946%20Risk%20Retention%20Study%20%20(FINAL).pdf; Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitization, in 2A THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1 (George Constantinides et al. eds., 2012);
Dov Solomon, The Rise of a Giant: Securitization and the Global Financial Crisis, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 859 (2012).
31. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
32. Saule T. Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881, 884-85 (2009); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in
REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86 (C. Coglianese ed., 2012).
33. Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation of Financial Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1149-50 (2009); Romano, supra note
32, at 88-89.
34. Enriques, supra note 33, at 1152-53; Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 79-80
(2003).
35. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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with the failures of the Enron and Worldcom affairs but merely recycled and repackaged “off the shelf” ideas with no clear connection to the financial crisis at hand.36
Congress’s desire to do something to contend with the public outrage led lawmakers
to throw together an assortment of controversial ideas and pass them into law. Sufficient consideration was not given to the contents of the proposed legislation, its connection to the causes of the financial predicaments, and its potential long-term impact
on the financial environment.37
Similar criticism was leveled against the reforms in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act,
and the analogy to “quack remedies” resurfaced. Stephen Bainbridge identifies a
number of different features of this type of hasty regulatory measure, including the
following: the regulation is passed in response to a financial crisis; its central purpose
is to defuse public criticism of corporations and/or the markets; it is generally not
based on new proposals but on longstanding policy that is being advanced by powerful interest groups; and the empirical evidence cited in support of the regulation is, at
best, mixed.38
The incentive to swiftly enact legislation following a financial crisis is clear: it
is essential for signaling to the public that the regulatory authorities are taking the
severity of the crisis seriously and are acting promptly and decisively to remedy the
situation. The importance of restoring investor confidence in the stability of financial
markets should not be underestimated. The short-term benefit of immediate action—
i.e., restoration of investor confidence—is likely to be more significant than the longterm damage that could be caused by ill-advised legislation. Theoretically, the shortterm advantages of positive signaling through swift legislation outweigh the potential
long-term disadvantages, which can be mitigated by more measured and prudent legislation in the future.
Given this potential for long-term damage, Romano suggests that a sunset provision be included in the legislation to limit its force to a certain time period unless
Congress decides to extend it.39 The reauthorization process would allow time for
gathering relevant information that might not have originally been available, for careful examination of the causes of the crisis and the implications of the legislation, and
for a retroactive evaluation of the legislation’s efficacy. This would make it easier for
Congress to correct any defects in the legislation and prevent long-term damage from
laws enacted quickly and under pressure. The automatic expiration of the law after a

36. Id. at 1523. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in Leisure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69, 70 (2006) (arguing that the SOX reforms were a compilation of ideas
thrown together by regulators and hastily enacted by Congress in order to divert the anger of investors in the
wake of the financial scandals).
37. Romano, supra note 35, at 1525-29. But see Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley
as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007) (defending
the SOX reforms and rejecting Romano’s criticism).
38. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Part II, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1779, 1795-96 (2011).
39. Romano, supra note 32, at 95-103; Romano, supra note 35, at 1599-1602. The biggest critic of the
proposal to include a subset provision is John Coffee. John C. Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank:
Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019
(2012). For Romano’s response to this criticism, see Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript
Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25 (2014).
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certain period should ease the burden of repealing flawed legislation and counteract
the natural tendency to reaffirm the status quo. The main disadvantage of Romano’s
proposal, however, is that such a provision would also dilute the signaling power of
the law as to the seriousness of the regulatory response to the crisis.40 The knowledge
that the legislation will expire unless reapproved will raise doubts as to the authorities’ long-term commitment to the regulatory process; it could be perceived as an
attempt to mislead the public in the short-term and simply “wait out the storm.” Such
a clause would thus undermine the goal of restoring investor confidence and reduce
the short-term benefits of the legislation.41
Some scholars have also observed that regulation following a crisis is often actually an attempt to address the problems of the past,42 focusing on past failures rather
than preparing for the challenges of the future. This article takes one step further by
arguing that not only does such regulation fail to meet future needs, it can even sow
the seeds of future crises. It looks back at how, historically, regulation that was
adopted pursuant to a major economic crisis not only failed to prevent a large-scale
crisis in the future but also created the conditions for its emergence. The discussion
analyzes legislation relating to non-recourse mortgages that was enacted in response
to the housing crisis of the Great Depression, pointing to its central contribution to
bringing on the mortgage crisis of the Great Recession.
III. NON-RECOURSE LEGISLATION
Housing purchases tend to be one of the biggest transactions of a person’s life.
The high purchase price of a home usually means that the buyer must obtain external
credit to finance the transaction. To secure the repayment of the loan, the buyer-borrower uses the house she intends to buy as collateral in favor of the financer-lender.
The mortgage is meant to ensure that if the borrower cannot repay the loan, the lender
can foreclose on the property, turn the borrower out, and sell the property. The
amount collected from the sale of the house will then be used to recover the outstanding balance of the debt.
Non-recourse mortgages are secured only by the mortgaged property, with the
borrower bearing no personal liability for repayment of the loan. Though personal
liability was a fundamental component of classic common law mortgages,43 modern
legal systems allow for the option of mortgages with no personal liability for borrowers.44 In the absence of such liability, the lender’s only remedy in the event of default
40. Romano herself identifies two other flaws in the proposal to include a sunset provision: the lack of
flexibility in determining the timetable for evaluating and reapproving the legislation and the increasing of the
burden on Congress. Romano, supra note 35, at 1600.
41. Luca Enriques & Dirk Zetzsche, Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board Regulation
Under the New European Capital Requirement Directive, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 211, 242 (2015).
42. See, e.g., JOHN G. FRANCIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 182
(1993) (comparing the actions of the regulator to the actions of a military commander after losing a battle, in
that both focus on past failures rather than preparing for future challenges); Ribstein, supra note 34, at 78;
Romano, supra note 32, at 87.
43. GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 156-57 (2d ed. 1970).
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997) (“A mortgage is enforceable
whether or not any person is personally liable for that performance.”); Nelson & Whitman, supra note 4, § 2.1.
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is foreclosure. Even if the foreclosure sale price returns only a portion of the unpaid
debt, the lender is not able to seek a deficiency judgment against the borrower to
recover the outstanding balance from unsecured assets or future income. Moreover,
this lack of personal liability holds regardless of whether the borrower has the financial wherewithal to continue her monthly mortgage payments.
State legislation from the 1930s intended to protect borrowers is the historical
source of non-recourse mortgages. During the Great Depression, many borrowers
were unable to keep to the monthly repayment schedule on their mortgages. This
caused lenders to foreclose on the mortgaged properties and evict the borrowers from
their homes. The problem, however, was that in many cases, the foreclosure yielded
a significantly lower return than the outstanding balance of the debt, for three principal reasons. First, by its very nature as a forced sell at a given point in time, a foreclosure commonly fails to garner the fair market value for the foreclosed real estate.45
Second, during the Great Depression, housing prices fell dramatically even in regular,
non-foreclosure sales on the free market. And third, the shrinking housing financing
market during the Great Depression severely restricted the availability of credit,
which, in turn, significantly reduced the number of housing purchases and led to a
further decline in real estate prices.46
In the majority of cases, the lenders themselves would purchase the mortgaged
property at a minimal price during the foreclosure process.47 They would then imme-

45. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994). See also Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1417-18 (2004).
46. Hughes, supra note 5, at 125-26.
47. In many cases, the lender is the only party offering to buy the property in foreclosure. Moreover, even
in cases where there are other offers, the lender enjoys distinct advantages over other bidders. See Grant S.
Nelson, The Impact of Mortgagor Bankruptcy on the Real Estate Mortgagee: Current Problems and Some Suggested Solutions, 50 MO. L. REV. 217 (1985):
Frequently, the mortgagee is not only the foreclosure sale purchaser, but the only bidder attending
the sale. There are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, because the mortgagee can bid up to
the amount of the mortgage debt without putting up new cash, he has a distinct bidding advantage
over a third party bidder, who will have out-of-pocket expense from the first dollar bid. Second,
while foreclosure statutes require notice by publication to potential third party bidders, the notice,
especially in urban areas, is published in legal newspapers of limited circulation. Moreover, because
the publication is technical in nature, a potential third party purchaser has little idea what real estate
is being sold. Third, many potential third party purchasers are reluctant to buy land at a foreclosure
sale because of the difficulty of ascertaining if a purchaser will receive good and marketable title.
Fourth, when a mortgagee forecloses on improved real estate, potential bidders often find it difficult
to inspect the premises prior to sale. While it may be in the self-interest of the mortgagor to allow
third party inspection of the premises, mortgagors who are about to lose their real estate through a
foreclosure sale understandably are reluctant to cooperate.
See also Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 701 (2008). Empirical research shows that in many cases, the lender in fact
acquires the property in foreclosure. See, e.g., Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of
the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 663
(1997) (“In most cases, the only people present at the foreclosure sale are the lender, the borrower, and the party
conducting the foreclosure sale. Third parties successfully bid in only 11.2% of the 1993 judicial sales cases
and only 9.6% of the 1994 judicial sales cases.”); Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure
by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure: An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 875 (1985) (“In the sample of 118 foreclosure sales, the mortgagee bid successfully
in 91 cases, or seventy-seven percent of the total, and third parties bought in 27 cases, or twenty-three percent
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diately seek deficiency judgments against the borrowers for the large difference between the low foreclosure proceeds and the outstanding balance of the debt.48 If the
lender then sold the property for more than the foreclosure price, he realized windfall
profits. This situation benefited lenders since they obtained the mortgaged assets at a
minimal price and could continue to pursue claims against borrowers for the balance
of the debt and even profit. Borrowers, in contrast, not only lost their homes but were
also sued for the full amount of the debt.49 These dismal conditions for borrowers
prompted states to enact borrower-friendly legislation that would prevent lenders
from continuing to pursue borrowers for the remainder of the debt after foreclosure.50
The legislation prevented lenders from pursuing borrowers’ non-collateralized property and future incomes. It limited the scope of the lender’s remedy to the borrower’s
collateralized assets and precluded suing the borrower personally for the full amount
of the debt.51 This anti-deficiency judgment legislation effectively forced the parties
to the transaction into non-recourse mortgages.
Given the complexity of the anti-deficiency judgment legislation and the divergences between the various state laws, there is no consensus as to just how many US
states have adopted non-recourse legislation. The accepted estimate, however, is
around fifteen states,52 and a number of Canadian provinces have similarly adopted
non-recourse legislation.53 Despite the many variances, state anti-deficiency judgment laws can nonetheless be divided into four main categories:54 (1) laws prohibiting any deficiency under a loan secured by residential real estate; (2) laws prohibiting
any deficiency when the mortgage or deed of trust is “purchase money;” (3) laws

of the total.”).
48. The value of the secured claim includes the principle, interest earned, and the foreclosure expenses.
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2006) (“To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of
which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there
shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges
provided for under the agreement or State statute under which such claim arose.”); 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2006)
(“The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim,
including the payment of all ad valorem property taxes with respect to the property.”).
49. Hughes, supra note 5, at 126.
50. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 4.
51. Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2009).
52. Id. at 30 n.134 (estimating that around 15-20 states adopted non-recourse legislation, including some
of the largest states); Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Evidence from US States, 24 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 3139, 3143 (2011) (categorizing eleven states as having adopted
non-recourse legislation); Ron Harris & Asher Meir, Non-Recourse Mortgages—A Fresh Start, 21 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 119, 120 (2013) (estimating that between ten to fifteen states have adopted non-recourse legislation); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1073, 1113 (2009); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 157-58 (2009), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402043235/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-100909-report.pdf
[hereinafter OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT]. For a compilation of state laws related to foreclosure, see United
States Foreclosure Laws, http://www.foreclosurelaw.org/.
53. Lawrence D. Jones, Deficiency Judgments and the Exercise of the Default Option in Home Mortgage
Loans, 36 J.L. & ECON. 115, 117 (1993).
54. See 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING §§ 12:69-12:73 (rev. ed.
2015). A number of states have adopted more than one type of anti-deficiency judgment laws.
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prohibiting the recovery of any deficiency following a nonjudicial foreclosure by
power of sale;55 and (4) laws limiting the deficiency to the difference between the
loan balance owing and either the foreclosure sale price or the fair market value of
the property, whichever is greater. The last category of laws effectively denies recourse when the fair market value of the property is higher than the balance of the
debt, even if the amount received upon foreclosure is less than the loan balance.56
In Honeyman v. Jacobs57 and Gelfert v. National City Bank,58 the Supreme Court
confirmed state authority to interfere in mortgages through non-recourse legislation.
Many scholars and policymakers, however, have criticized the implications of such
legislation,59 arguing that it passes on high costs to borrowers, without them deriving
any significant benefit from this.60
IV. RISK ALLOCATION IN NON-RECOURSE MORTGAGES
The risk allocation between the parties in a non-recourse mortgage is directly
affected by fluctuations in the market price of the collateralized asset. When real estate prices rise and the value of the property becomes greater than the balance of the
mortgage, it is in the borrower’s interest to continue payment on the loan. However,
when real estate prices drop and the value of the property falls below the balance of
the debt, it is in the borrower’s interest to stop payment, walk away from the house
and rent another one,61 send the keys to the collateralized property to the lender, and
force the conclusion of the debt. In such cases of negative equity, strategic default is
an attractive option for a borrower, even if she is able to afford the monthly mortgage

55. The rationale for not allowing the lender recovery of any deficiency following a nonjudicial foreclosure is that the lender’s choice of a nonjudicial process denied the borrower certain protections, such as redemption rights, that accompany judicial foreclosure.
56. Hughes, supra note 5, at 125.
57. 306 U.S. 539, 543 (1939).
58. 313 U.S. 221, 231 (1941).
59. See, for example, the remarks of Congressman Jeb Hensarling, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra
note 52, at 157: “[H]omeowners have become aware of the economic implications arising from applicable ‘antideficiency’ and ‘single-action’ laws and other rules adopted in many states that permit, if not indirectly encourage, homeowners to avoid their contractual mortgage obligations.”
60. See, e.g., Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS.
143, 146 (1982) (finding that anti-deficiency judgment laws raise interest rates on loans backed by newly built
homes by 13.87 basis points and for existing homes by 22.65 basis points); SUSAN E. WOODWARD, U.S. DEP’T
OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. A STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHA MORTGAGES 50-52 (2008), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/FHA_closing_cost.pdf (finding that anti-deficiency judgment laws
raise costs to borrowers by $550 per $100,000 of loan amount); Brent W. Ambrose & Anthony B. Sanders,
Legal Restrictions in Personal Loan Markets, 30 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 133, 149 (2005) (finding that
borrowers in states with non-recourse legislation pay higher credit costs on high LTV mortgages by about 33
basis points). But see Schill, supra note 3.
61. Theoretically, a borrower may prefer to buy a new house rather than rent. However, walking away
from her current home and defaulting on the mortgage payments will affect her credit score, and it will be
difficult for her to obtain a new loan. If the borrower wants to buy a new house, she must get a new mortgage
before defaulting on the current mortgage and damaging her credit score. Therefore, in most cases, the borrower
will be inclined to rent a different house rather than buy a new one. See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 640, 655 n.265.
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payments.62
This risk allocation between the parties can be described as a put option the
lender gives to the borrower. The option allows the borrower to stop repayment of
the mortgage and eliminate the outstanding debt in exchange for transferring the collateralized property to the lender.63 By exercising this option, the borrower essentially
sells the property to the lender for the price of the balance of the debt. Applying the
model of options to non-recourse mortgages predicts that strategic default by the borrower will occur when the option is “in the money,” i.e., when there is negative equity
in the property.64
Although negative equity creates a strong incentive for strategic default, other
factors, economic and otherwise, can influence a borrower’s decision.65 When the
property is the borrower’s place of residence, she will incur transitional costs, including the difficulties of renting or buying a new home, moving expenses, the costs of
changing schools, and loss of communal and social ties (assuming the new home is
not in the same vicinity as the former home).66 Defaulting on a loan will also become
part of the borrower’s credit history, which will hurt her credit rating67 and make it
difficult for her to obtain credit in the future.68 In addition, moral considerations
might influence the borrower’s decision.69 Defaulting on a loan is perceived by some
as immoral and irresponsible70 and to be avoided even if doing so incurs significant

62. See, e.g., John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order, Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims Models of Mortgage Default, 11 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 99, 106 (1995) (indicating that negative equity is strongly associated with higher default rates); Levitin, supra note 61, at 639-40 (arguing that in the case of non-recourse
mortgages, walking away is an attractive option for a homeowner with negative equity who can find a better
rental deal elsewhere).
63. A different way of terminating the mortgage early is by prepayment, i.e., when the loan is paid in full
prior to maturity. This can be viewed as a call option that allows the borrower to buy back the remaining mortgage payments from the lender at the prevailing mortgage rate. For a review of the literature on mortgage termination risk, see Michael LaCour-Little, Review Articles: Mortgage Termination Risk: A Review of the Recent
Literature, 16 J. REAL ESTATE LITERATURE 297 (2008).
64. Yongheng Deng et al., Mortgage Terminations, Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options,
68 ECONOMETRICA 275, 284 (2000).
65. Levitin, supra note 61, at 638.
66. In addition to these costs, there are the unique qualities of the current home. Many people remodel
their homes to fit their needs. Therefore, walking away from one’s home also involves the loss of the specific
compatibility of that house with one’s needs. See Guiso et al., supra note 20, at 1480.
67. Foreclosure can cause an immediate drop in the borrower’s credit rating by 140-150 points on the
Vantage scale and appear as a mark in the credit bureau records for up to seven years. Kenneth R. Harney, The
Nation’s Housing: Credit Score Conundrums, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/10/AR2009091004532.html.
68. However, White estimates that the larger the scale of the negative equity, the more significant the
borrower’s savings in strategic default relative to the damage to her credit rating. Brent T. White, Underwater
and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 971, 983-85 (2010). Furthermore, given the high incidence of insolvency during the financial crisis, future
lenders may attribute less significance to default during the crisis than they would to default in a period of
prosperity. See Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 51, at 32.
69. For a broad discussion of the morality of strategic default, see White, supra note 19; White, supra note
68; Curtis Bridgeman, The Morality of Jingle Mail: Moral Myths About Strategic Default, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 123 (2011); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547 (2011).
70. See, for example, Henry M. Paulson Jr., U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, U.S. Housing and Mortgage
Market Update, Address Before the National Association of Business Economists (Mar. 3 2008), available at
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costs.71 Moreover, there is the negative social stigma attached to strategic default;
thus even borrowers with no particular moral qualms may be willing to put aside their
own economic interests and continue payment to avoid the social costs.72
Given these mitigating factors, the likelihood of strategic default is lower when
there is a low level of negative equity in the asset, and vice versa: the greater the
negative equity in the property, the greater the incentive to default on the mortgage.
This is supported by the empirical evidence of a strong correlation between the level
of negative equity and the propensity of borrowers to default. Guiso et al. found that
when negative equity in the property was 10% of the value of the house, only 7.4%
of borrowers wanted to stop repayment of the mortgage, whereas when negative equity increased to 40%-50%, the willingness to default rose to 12.4%.73 Moreover, not
only did the relative value matter, but the absolute value of the negative equity was
significant as well. Per given relative value of an equity shortfall, roughly 7% more
households were willing to default when the shortfall was $100,000 as opposed to
$50,000.74 Tirupattur et al. also found that at low levels of negative equity, strategic
default rates are also relatively low, but pick up steadily as the level of negative equity
rises.75 In conclusion, the propensity for default clearly increases as the proportion of
negative equity in the property and its absolute value grow.
Risk allocation is significantly different in cases where recourse is an option.76
With recourse mortgage, a lender who wants to be repaid is not limited to the collat-

https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp856.aspx. (“[L]et me emphasize, any homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply
a speculator—and one who is not honoring his obligations.”). See also Fox Business: Some Homeowners Who
Can’t Pay Choosing to Just Walk Away (Fox Business television broadcast Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.foxbusiness.com/video/index.html?playerId=videolandingpage&streamingFormat=FLASH&referralObject=3644995&referralPlaylistId=1292d14d0e3afdcf0b31500afefb92724c08f046:
Seems obscene. Everyone else in the country is trying to pay their mortgages and trying to get things
done. They realize in many cases they are underwater that their mortgage is worth more than their
home. If you have obnoxious kids, walk away from your kids. Seems weird. Doesn’t it? . . . I know
you are not looking at the ethics of this; you are a good and savvy businessman. Do you find it even
a tinge offensive that we are moving away from personal responsibility? If we can’t hack it we bail
out of it . . . And you know when you enter into an agreement and everyone just throws up the keys
and says you know it’s really tough this month, it’s gonna be tough next month, declining real estate
values, we are just going to quit. Can you imagine if we all did that going into World War II? The
Japanese just kicked our butts at Pearl Harbor, the odds are overwhelming, the Germans have just
taken over Europe, and we just quit. What would happen if we all quit? Let’s just cease and desist.
In contrast, White argues that strategic default should not be portrayed in a negative light, because mortgage arrangement allows the borrower to stop payment on the debt and send the keys to the lender. White, supra
note 68.
71. Guiso et al., supra note 20, at 1481.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1483.
74. Id. at 1483-84.
75. Vishwanath Tirupattur et al., ABS Market Insights: Understanding Strategic Defaults, MORGAN STANLEY 5 (Apr. 29, 2010), available at http://www.transunion.com/docs/rev/business/financialservices/FS_MorganStanleyStrategicDefaultResearch.pdf.
76. Most countries in the world allow lenders a right of recourse to the borrower. See Harris & Meir, supra
note 52, at 128-29 (arguing that recourse loans are common practice in most countries, including Japan, Australia, Israel, and European countries); see references in id. n.49.
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eralized property; he may also pursue repayment from any of the borrower’s uncollateralized property or future incomes.77 Since the borrower bears personal liability
for repayment of the debt, walking away from the mortgaged property is not a useful
strategy even if its value drops below the balance of the debt. This would not terminate the debt, as the borrower would be liable to repay the entire balance from her
other assets and future incomes.
Empirical studies confirm the premise that default rates in “recourse” states are
significantly lower than the rates in “non-recourse” states. Demiroglu et al. compared
default rates in states with and without anti-deficiency laws and found that borrowers
with negative equity are significantly more likely to default in non-recourse states.78
Ghent & Kudlyak found that on average, borrowers in non-recourse states are 32%
more likely to default than borrowers in recourse states.79 Tirupattur et al. similarly
found that the strategic default rate in California, a non-recourse state, is much higher
than the strategic default rate in Florida, a recourse state.80 The difference between
recourse and non-recourse jurisdictions has been examined in Canada as well. Jones
analyzed data from the Canadian provinces of Alberta, which does not allow for recourse, and British Columbia, which does, and found that strategic defaults are more
likely to occur in Alberta.81
A possible explanation for the lower default rates in recourse states is the deterrent effect of the lender’s ability to seek a deficiency judgment against the borrower
to recover the outstanding balance from non-collateralized assets and future incomes.
Ghent & Kudlyak analyzed the deterrent effect of recourse on residential mortgage
default and found that its magnitude closely correlates with the borrower’s wealth: it
increases with borrowers who have more assets to protect.82 Bhutta et al. also examined the deterrent effect of recourse on borrowers. They found that the median borrower in Nevada and Florida (recourse states) defaults when she is 20 to 30 percentage points more underwater than the median borrower in California and Arizona
(non-recourse states).83 These findings suggest that in recourse states, borrowers factor into the costs of default the potential personal liability that comes with foreclosure.
The difference between recourse and non-recourse states, however, is mitigated
to some extent by the fact that, even in recourse states, borrowers might not necessarily be exposed to the risk that lenders will seek deficiency judgments against them.
Certain government agencies, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA),
have adopted official or informal policies of refraining from bringing personal claims

77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 (1997).
78. Cem Demiroglu et al., State Foreclosure Laws and the Incidence of Mortgage Default, 57 J.L. &
ECON. 225 (2014).
79. Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 52, at 3153.
80. Tirupattur et al., supra note 75, at 3.
81. Jones, supra note 53, at 127-29.
82. Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 52, at 3159-62.
83. Neil Bhutta et al., The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Provisions 25 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Working Paper No. 2010-35, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf.
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against borrowers.84 In addition, given that suing defaulting borrowers requires a
substantial time and money investment, deficiency judgments are rare, even in the
private sector.85 This is especially apparent in states where lenders are overburdened
with foreclosures.86 Moreover, the potential of personal claims is further limited by
the borrower’s resources. Particularly in cases where little or no down payment was
made as a result of insufficient assets, borrowers may be judgment-proof and simply
lack the property with which to repay their debt.87 Therefore, in a cost-benefit analysis, pursuing defaulting borrowers may prove to be not worthwhile, making the
mortgages in question de facto non-recourse loans, even in recourse jurisdictions.88
V. RELAXING DOWN PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS
Homebuyers were traditionally required to invest a significant amount of their
own to obtain a loan for the purchase of a home. Lenders in the US required at least
20% of the total value of the home to be put down by borrowers so as to reduce
risks.89 This created an “equity cushion” that covered the costs of foreclosure and
protected against potential losses from declining real estate prices. Particularly crucial for non-recourse mortgages: down payments reduced the likelihood of reaching
a state of negative equity in the property, thereby preventing mortgages from being
“in the money” and making strategic default less likely.90
In the 1990s, however, there was a significant easing of down payment requirements.91 Lenders began offering loans with high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios that
would allow homebuyers to obtain financing for the full amount of their purchases.92

84. See John Mixon, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents Interpreted as Nonrecourse
Debt (with Poetic Comments Lifted from Carl Sandburg), 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 35, 39-40 (2008); Jones, supra
note 53, at 118; Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 52, at 3141.
85. Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 244 (1998) (“Lenders brought a deficiency action within one year after
the foreclosure sale in approximately six to seven percent of the foreclosure sale cases.”); Wechsler, supra note
47, at 878 (“[O]f the ninety-four studied cases in which the foreclosure sale left a deficiency amount, the mortgagee obtained a deficiency judgment in only one case, and in that case the judgment was not satisfied”); Vikas
Bajaj, Mortgage Holders Find It Hard to Walk Away from Their Homes, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at C1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/10/business/10housing.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
86. White, supra note 68, at 985.
87. Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 51, at 30.
88. Grant S. Nelson & Gabriel D. Serbulea, Strategic Defaulters Versus the Federal Taxpayer: A Brief for
the Preemption of State Anti-Deficiency Law for Residential Mortgages, 61 ARK. L. REV. 65, 72 (2013); BarGill, supra note 52, at 1113; Harris & Meir, supra note 52, at 126.
89. Bar-Gill, supra note 52, at 1076.
90. White, supra note 68, at 1008.
91. See Rosner, supra note 7, at 7-8 (describing the relaxation of credit standards in the 1990s, including
the drastic reduction of minimum down payment levels from 20% to zero).
92. The relaxing of down payment requirements made homeownership accessible to a population that, in
the past, was only able to rent. Indeed, homeownership rates in the US increased as the requirements for getting
mortgages eased up. According to the FDIC, homeownership in 2005 stood at 68.9% compared with 63.9% two
decades earlier. Greg Griffin et al., No Money Down: A High-Risk Gamble, DENVER POST, Sept. 17, 2006,
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_4347686. See also U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership: Historical Tables, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/index.html (compilation of
data on homeownership in the US from 1965 to today).
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Although studies had indicated a correlation between high LTV ratios and the probability of reaching a state of negative equity and default,93 over the years, lenders
increasingly declined to insist on down payments.94
No-money-down mortgages became popular in the early 2000s. In many cases,
borrowers could avoid putting down any money upfront by taking out credit insurance for housing loans with high LTV ratios or second mortgages.95 The median96
LTV ratio in the subprime market, including first and second mortgages, rose from
90% in 2003 to 100% during 2005-2007.97 Furthermore, between August 2004 and
July 2005, more than 40% of first-time homebuyers obtained loans with no down
payment requirement.98 These data show that in the period leading up to the mortgage
meltdown, about half of the housing loans had no down payment requirement.
This relaxation of down payment requirements led to an increase in the number
of borrowers, the value of the properties being purchased, and the proportion of
monthly income allotted for mortgage repayment. Borrowers who were unable to
furnish the traditional 20% down payment were still able to obtain mortgages and
purchase homes. Some borrowers were able to purchase homes that were more expensive than those for which they could afford the 20% down payment. As a result
of the increase in the value of the houses and the level of financing, monthly mortgage
payments accounted for a higher percentage of borrowers’ household expenditures.99
A number of factors can account for this lowering of credit standards, but most
striking was the meteoric development of the securitization market.100 The use of
securitization as a financing tool began in the 1970s, when lenders began to securitize
mortgages.101 Over the years, securitization in general and securitization of mort-

93. See, e.g., JOHN P. HERZOG & JAMES S. EARLEY, HOME MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE
(1970); Deng et al., supra note 64; Griffin et al., supra note 92 (showing that more than half the foreclosures
on homes in August 2006 were for loans with no down payment requirements).
94. White, supra note 68, at 1008.
95. For data on the rise in second mortgages (“piggybacks”) in the years preceding the meltdown, see
Mayer et al., supra note 15, at 6.
96. The median is the middle numerical value in a distribution set, such that half of the values are less
than or equal to it and half are greater than or equal to it.
97. Mayer et al., supra note 15, at 6.
98. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Down Payments’ Downward Trend, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2006, at F1,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/20/AR2006012000803.html.
99. For a discussion of the impact of the combination of non-recourse mortgages and lack of down payment requirements, see infra Part VI.
100. Another accepted explanation for the relaxation of credit standards is the intense

competition in the banking sector. See generally Jacob A. Bikker et al., Misspecification
in the Panzar-Rosse Model: Assessing Competition in the Banking Industry (De Nederlandsche Bank, Working Paper No. 114, 2006), available at http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Working%20Paper%20114-2006_tcm46-146771.pdf (exploring competition in the
banking sector).
101. For a historical survey of the development of the mortgage securitization market in the US, see Joseph
C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1369, 1383-88 (1991); John J. McConnell & Stephen A. Buser, The Origins and Evolution of the Market
for Mortgage-Backed Securities, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 173 (2011).
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gages in particular grew, to the point where most subprime mortgages were securitized prior to the outbreak of the mortgage crisis.102 Securitization has thus become a
central financial tool in the modern economy.103 It allows banks to take advantage of
assets that produce predictable income, such as mortgages, to obtain interim financing for economic activities.104 To securitize mortgages, banks separate them from the
rest of their assets, bundle them together, and sell them to a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) that is created for the sole purpose of the securitization. The SPV finances the
transaction by issuing securities backed by the securitized mortgages (mortgagebacked securities).105
The mortgage market is sub-divided into a primary and secondary markets. In
the primary market, mortgage agreements are made between homebuyers and banks.
Securitization then turns the illiquid mortgage loans that were created in the primary
market into mortgage-backed securities that can be bought and sold in a secondary
market. The banks that originated the loans backing the securities are not actually
party to the trade between the investors in the secondary market. The secondary mortgage market enables the bypassing of the financial institution’s mediation process
and the formation of a direct link between lenders and borrowers through daily trade
on the stock exchange.106
The main criticism of securitization is that it creates a disconnect between the
banks and the mortgages they securitize, thereby lessening the ex-ante incentive for
banks to ensure the quality of their mortgages.107 Banks can relax their criteria for
mortgage loans, knowing that they will not bear the risks of the loan.108 Empirical
findings have, in fact, revealed such a propensity on the part of lenders to securitize
riskier loans, such as subprime or Alt-A mortgages. In 2006, 75% of subprime loans
and 91% of Alt-A loans were securitized, compared to only 46% of jumbo loans,
which are regular loans to prime borrowers.109 Another study found a rise in securitization in areas with high levels of subprime loans.110
102. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040 (2007).
103. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996); Thomas E.

Plank, Bankruptcy Professionals, Debtor Dominance, and the Future of Bankruptcy: A
Review and a Rhapsody on a Theme, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 337, 362 (2002) (reviewing
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA
(2001)); Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization and Asymmetric
Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 162 (2005).
104. Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization of The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Structured
Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 529-30 (1995); Robert Stark, Viewing the LTV Steel ABS Opinion in
Its Proper Context, 27 J. CORP. L. 211, 213 (2002); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization,
1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135-36 (1994).
105. Iacobucci & Winter, supra note 103, at 164.
106. Andrew R. Berman, “Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage”—The Use (and Misuse of) Mezzanine
Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 76, 77-78 (2005).
107. See references supra note 8.
108. Engel & McCoy, supra note 102, at 2065-68.
109. Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit
2 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 318, 2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr318.pdf.
110. Mian & Sufi, supra note 8.
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Because of the information gap between the banks that originate the mortgages
and the investors in MBSs, banks can shift the risks in the loans to investors without
that shift being completely reflected in the price. The difficulty in assessing the risk
and pricing it accordingly can be attributed to financial engineering. When complex
derivatives of MBSs are created, any connection to the risks inherent in the original
housing loans becomes difficult to see.111 The inability of investors to evaluate the
risks was a factor in the collapse of the MBS market in late 2007, which triggered the
global financial crisis.112
VI. THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN
Non-recourse loans allow borrowers to limit their liability in the event of default
on their loan payments. A lack of a down payment requirement further reduces borrowers’ loss in default. This Part now shows how the combination of these two features of the US mortgage market contributed to the housing boom and bust in the
2000s.113
During the 2000s, the ability to obtain full financing for real estate purchases
without bearing any personal liability incentivized potential homebuyers to take out
loans to purchase houses they could not finance themselves and benefit from having
a place to live. When housing prices rose, borrowers reaped the profits—profits that
were not shared with lenders beyond the interest payments on the loans. If a borrower
failed to realize the profits at the right time and the house subsequently decreased in
value, she could walk away from her home; this forced the lender to foreclose, and
the debt was terminated. As explained, with a non-recourse mortgage, the lender
could not seek a deficiency judgment, leaving the borrower with no liability for the

111. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 229 n.98
(2009); AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM, RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITIZATION MARKETS 5
(2008), http://www.sifma.org (“The level of complexity of products developed during the height of the market
boom. . . exceeded the analytical and risk management capabilities of even some of the most sophisticated market participants.”).
112. See generally Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown,
41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 (2009) (arguing that securitization of subprime mortgages and the creation of complex
derivatives were the main factors behind the financial crisis).
113. Some scholars have analyzed separately each of these features of the US mortgage market and pointed
to the independent role each one played in the crisis. On the lack of recourse, see Martin Feldstein, How to Save
an
‘Underwater’ Mortgage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204908604574330883957532854 (“No-recourse mortgages increase foreclosures, resulting in more properties being thrown on the market, and lead to an excess decline in house prices.”); Ron
Harris, Recourse and Non-Recourse Mortgages: Foreclosure, Bankruptcy, Policy 2-3 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591524 (“More scholars now realize that this feature plays an important role in the
unfolding of the subprime crisis . . . It seems that the prevalence of non-recourse mortgages leads to more foreclosures, a slump in home prices, losses to lenders and holders of mortgage-backed-securities (MBS), and has
spurred the economic crisis.”); Kris Gerardi et al., Did Nonrecourse Mortgages Cause the Mortgage Crisis?,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, Feb. 18, 2010, http://realestateresearch.frbatlanta.org/rer/2010/02/did-nonrecourse-mortgages-cause-the-mortgage-crisis.html. On the lack of down payment requirements, see Mayer et
al., supra note 15, at 16 (“The rise in combined loan-to-value ratios suggests that lower down payments and an
increased use of second liens could have been important contributors to the mortgage crisis.”). The forthcoming
discussion in the text above goes a step further and analyzes the negative impacts of the combination of these
two features of the US mortgage market.
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balance of the loan. The availability of credit with little risk upfront (no down payment) or liability afterward (no recourse to non-collateralized assets) considerably
increased the demand for real estate, which caused prices to skyrocket and created a
real estate bubble.114
The combination of non-recourse mortgages with the elimination of down payment requirements resulted in a distortion of the risk allocation in the mortgage market.115 A moral hazard was created when borrowers were no longer subject to an exante requirement to invest personal equity or to ex-post personal liability for repayment. They could now externalize the risk of default to third parties, such as investors
in mortgage-backed securities and, more broadly, society at large.116
Using the structure of the repayment schedule, lenders exploited borrowers’ cognitive biases, such as myopia, to strengthen the incentive to take out a mortgage.117
In many cases, the terms of the mortgage allowed for a significant grace period before
the monthly repayments began. In other cases, lenders gave adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) with low starting interest rates,118 in line with the macroeconomic
policy of the US Federal Reserve in the years leading up to the mortgage meltdown.119 Myopic borrowers focus on the short-term benefits of the initial low payments and undervalue the long-term costs of the future high payments. Low starting
interest rates lured borrowers in, raising the demand for these mortgages and bloating
the housing finance market. The problems only arose at the end of the grace period
or after the variable interest rate went up and borrowers had difficulty making their
monthly payments.120
As lenders began foreclosure proceedings on collateralized properties, many
houses went up for sale in order to repay the debts of the borrowers.121 The massive
wave of foreclosures led to a housing glut on the market and a resulting sharp drop
in real estate prices.122 When housing prices fell, many borrowers whom had not been

114. Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 15.
115. For a comparison of risk allocation in non-recourse mortgages without a down payment requirement
and in undercapitalization by shareholders, see Dov Solomon & Odelia Minnes, Non-Recourse, No Down Payment and the Mortgage Meltdown: Lessons from Undercapitalization, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 529,
562-65 (2011).
116. Borrowers who are evicted from their homes often seek aid from the welfare state and special assistance programs for victims of the crisis. Thus, the cost of the failure of the mortgage is borne by society as a
whole.
117. Bar-Gill, supra note 52, at 1119-21.
118. Veena Trehan, The Mortgage Market: What Happened?, NPR, Apr. 26, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9855669 (reporting that one-third of ARMs originating
between 2004 and 2006 began with “teaser” rates below 4%, which increased significantly after two or three
years and as much as doubled monthly payments).
119. John B. Taylor, How Government Created the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A19
(criticizing the Federal Reserve for its policy of keeping interest rates below known monetary guidelines, which
resulted in the housing boom and bust).
120. Feldstein, supra note 113.
121. James R. Hagerty, Defaults Rise on Home Mortgages Insured by FHA, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123840821794969275.
122. For empirical research that studies the effect of foreclosure proceedings on housing prices, see LPS
Releases Study That Demonstrates Impact of Foreclosure Sales on Home Prices (Sept. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.bkfs.com/CorporateInformation/NewsRoom/Pages/20090903.aspx. See also CONG. OVERSIGHT
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required to make a down payment found themselves with significant negative equity
in their properties.123 California, a non-recourse state, was notorious for its high rates
of negative equity. The highest national negative equity rates were in three metropolitan areas of California: Merced, El Centro, and Modesto, with 85%, 85%, and 84%
underwater mortgaged properties respectively.124
Furthermore, their negative equity in their properties greatly reduced borrowers’
incentives to invest in maintaining the homes.125 Borrowers with significant negative
equity understood that any investment in repairing or improving their homes would
benefit only the lenders in foreclosure: although this would raise the property’s value,
that value would go to the lender alone. Thus, a vicious cycle set in, where properties
were neglected, their value dropped further, and the negative equity in the asset
grew.126
The sharp decline in housing prices led to an uptick in both the number of borrowers with negative equity in their properties and the proportion of that negative
equity. As a result, strategic default became a rational choice for an increasing number of borrowers.127 Even borrowers with the financial means to continue their mortgage payments often found it worthwhile to default.128 Foreclosure proceedings
flooded the collapsing real estate market, triggering a further deterioration in housing
prices.
Thus, non-recourse mortgages with no requirements for down payments had a
negative impact both ex ante and ex post. They created an incentive for borrowers to
take out irresponsible loans that did not correlate with their ability to repay them.
PANEL, THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION 9 (2009), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010739/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-030609-report.pdf
[hereinafter CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT] (showing that a foreclosure of one house reduces the value of
the eighty adjacent houses by $5000, and thus when a number of foreclosures occur in the same area, the effect
on the value of surrounding houses is exponential).
123. The rate of borrowers in the US with negative equity in their property reached 24% at the end of the
fourth quarter of 2009. In absolute numbers, this translates into about 11.3 million homes. Moreover, 2.3 million
additional homes were close to having negative equity, that is, equity was less than 5%. In total, nearly 29% of
borrowers had or nearly had negative equity in their homes. See Bill McBride, Q4 Report: 11.3 Million U.S.
Properties with Negative Equity, CALCULATED RISK (Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2010/02/q4-report-113-million-us-properties.html. See also DEUTSCHE BANK, DROWNING IN
DEBT—A LOOK AT “UNDERWATER” HOMEOWNERS 2 (Aug. 5, 2009), available at https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/DB_August_6_2009.pdf (estimating that 14 million borrowers in the US had
negative equity by the end of the first quarter of 2009, approximately 27% of all homeowners with mortgages).
124. White, supra note 68, at 974-75.
125. Levitin, supra note 61, at 640. Furthermore, in states with non-recourse legislation, borrowers have
low incentive to invest in home maintenance, even without negative equity. Since the lender is prevented from
pursuing the borrower’s personal assets and future incomes, the borrower’s potential loss in the event of default
is less than in states where lenders are allowed to pursue deficiency judgments. Therefore, the borrower has a
weaker incentive to maintain the high value of the property in order to lower the probability that its market
value will be less than the balance of the debt. See John P. Harding et al., Deficiency Judgments and Borrower
Maintenance: Theory and Evidence, 9 J. HOUS. ECON. 267 (2000).
126. See OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 52, at 11.
127. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, supra note 122, at 23-30 (arguing that negative equity in the property is the best predictor of default on mortgages); Jain & Jordan, supra note 14 (“In a time of falling house
prices and negative equity, it is only logical for homeowners to walk away from their houses (and their mortgage
payments) and send the keys back to the lender.”).
128. For data on borrowers’ propensity during the mortgage meltdown to default on mortgages even if they
could afford to pay them, see Guiso et al., supra note 20.

182

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 42:2

These loans made the option of strategic default ex post more attractive to borrowers
with negative equity in the property.129
VII. NON-RECOURSE REGULATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MELTDOWN
The analysis above showed how non-recourse mortgages were a significant factor in the 2000s housing boom and bust. One would expect that the lessons of the
mortgage crisis would have led state legislators to limit the scope of anti-deficiency
laws. However, quite the opposite happened. Following the meltdown, the legislatures in some of the leading foreclosure states, in fact, expanded the scope of mandatory non-recourse mortgage legislation.
Nevada is an interesting example of a state that shifted from a recourse regime
to a non-recourse regime following the mortgage crisis. In Nevada, a lender generally
has the right to sue a borrower for a deficiency if the suit is brought within six months
of the foreclosure sale.130 The borrower is entitled to a deficiency hearing, and the
lender must give the borrower notice of the hearing at least fifteen days in advance.131
After the hearing, the court determines the fair market value of the property at the
time of the foreclosure sale and awards a deficiency judgment.132 The judgment must
be for the lesser of the following two amounts: (a) the difference between the outstanding debt and the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure
sale, or (b) the difference between the outstanding debt and the foreclosure sale
price.133
Following the mortgage meltdown, however, the Nevada state legislature
amended its rule from recourse to non-recourse. Thus, for loans originating on or
after October 1, 2009, Nevada law prohibits lenders from suing borrowers for a deficiency after a foreclosure sale if all of the following five conditions are met: (1) the
lender is a financial institution; (2) the property securing the mortgage is a singlefamily dwelling owned by the borrower at the time of the foreclosure sale; (3) the
property was the borrower’s primary residence continuously from the time the mortgage was executed; (4) the amount of the mortgage loan was used to purchase the

129. Compare Ghent & Kudlyak supra note 52 (finding that in non-recourse states, borrowers with property
value significantly below the balance of their debt choose strategic default even when they are able to continue
repayment), with Christopher L. Foote et al., Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence, 64 J.
URB. ECON. 234 (2008) (concluding that negative equity is a necessary but insufficient condition for default).
However, the latter study is based on research from Massachusetts, which does allow lenders to seek deficiency
judgments against borrowers. The decision to default in a recourse state, such as Massachusetts, is much less
sensitive to negative equity than in a non-recourse state.
130. NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.455 (1987).
131. NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.457 (1969).
132. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 40.457, 40.459 (1969).
133. NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.459 (1969).
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property; and (5) the borrower did not refinance the mortgage.134 Moreover, deficiency judgments are prohibited after a short sale135 or deed in lieu of foreclosure136
if all of the following six conditions are met: (1) the lender is a financial institution;
(2) the property securing the mortgage is a single-family dwelling owned by the borrower at the time of the sale in lieu of a foreclosure sale; (3) the property was the
borrower’s primary residence continuously from the time the mortgage was executed;
(4) the amount of the mortgage loan was used to purchase the property; (5) the agreement between the borrower and the lender does not state the amount of money still
owed to the lender by the borrower and does not authorize the lender to recover that
amount from the borrower; and (6) the agreement contains a conspicuous statement
that the lender has waived the right to seek a deficiency judgment.137
California was considered a non-recourse state long before the mortgage meltdown. A deficiency judgment following a nonjudicial foreclosure is not allowed in
California.138 California adopted the “one-action” rule, which provides that after default on a mortgage, the lender’s sole remedy is a foreclosure action, and any claim
for a deficiency must be sought by way of that proceeding.139 This means that the
lender can opt to pursue a judicial foreclosure and then seek a deficiency judgment,140
so long as the borrower is not protected by California’s anti-deficiency legislation, or
else pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure and forego a deficiency judgment.141 Either one
of these options, once completed, constitutes one action.142 In California, almost all
residential foreclosures are nonjudicial, making deficiency judgments very uncommon.143 A deficiency judgment is also prohibited in judicial foreclosure if the loan
was for the purchase money for an owner-occupied dwelling that consists of one to

134. NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.455 (2009).
135. A short sale is a remedy negotiated between a defaulting borrower and a lender. The borrower sells
the house for an amount less than the outstanding mortgage debt, and the lender agrees to accept this lesser
amount and cancel the foreclosure.
136. Like a short sale, a deed in lieu of foreclosure is also a negotiated remedy between a defaulting borrower and a lender. The borrower transfers title to the property to the lender, and the lender cancels the foreclosure.
137. NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.458 (2011).
138. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d.
139. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (“There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt or
the enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage upon real property.”). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 (1997); MADISON ET AL., supra note 54, §§ 12:62-12:68.
140. Under the “security-first” policy of the “one-action” rule, the lender is required to first foreclose before
attempting to sue the borrower personally to collect the debt.
141. Nonjudicial foreclosure saves the lender substantial time and money compared to judicial foreclosure.
See Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT.
177, 177-78 (2006) (estimating that foreclosing judicially takes 5 months longer on average than the nonjudicial
alternative and imposes higher transaction costs by as much as 10% of the loan balance).
142. The purpose of the “one-action” rule is “to limit a secured creditor to a single suit to enforce its security
interest and collect its debt and to compel the exhaustion of all security before a monetary deficiency judgment
may be obtained against the debtor.” Nat’l Enters., Inc. v. Woods, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
143. Historically, judicial foreclosures have amounted to only 1% of all foreclosures each year. See Insolvency Law Committee of the State Bar of California Business Law Section, Proposal to Extend Anti-Deficiency
Protection to Refinanced Mortgage Obligations, Bls-2012-04, at 2 (proposed May 27, 2011), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/legislation/proposals/BLS-2012-04-anti-deficiency_protection-ADA.pdf.
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four units, or if the loan was financed by the seller.144 Moreover, a lender is not entitled to a deficiency judgment following a short sale on a residential property that
contains no more than four units.145
Following the mortgage crisis, California expanded the protection to borrowers
even further. In 2012, section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure was
amended to extend purchase money anti-deficiency protection to homeowners who
refinanced their home loans on or after January 1, 2013. The amended rule now protects homeowners who refinanced their original home mortgages from deficiency
judgments after a judicial foreclosure, but only up to the principal amount of the
original purchase loan that remains unpaid at the time of foreclosure.146
Similar to regulators’ response to the housing crisis during the Great Depression,
it seems that the regulatory reaction to the Great Recession has also been focused on
relieving the dire situation of borrowers. Vast numbers of borrowers lost their homes
in foreclosure proceedings that yielded a significantly lower return than the outstanding balance of the debt; they were then exposed to the risk that lenders would sue
them personally for the large deficiency. State regulators therefore moved swiftly to
widen the scope of anti-deficiency protection to prevent lenders from continuing to
pursue borrowers for the remainder of their debt after foreclosure.
Addressing the predicament of borrowers in the aftermath of a crisis is, of course,
vital and should be at the top of regulators’ agenda. Anti-deficiency laws are intended
to alleviate the plight of borrowers who have lost their homes and protect them from
deficiency judgments. The focus of this regulation is on the ex post borrowers’ burden. However, regulators should not only engage in the ex post impact of the regulatory measures but also take into account the long-term ex-ante consequences. From
an ex ante perspective, anti-deficiency laws create an incentive for excessive borrowing. Non-recourse mortgages encourage borrowers to take out loans they may not be
able to repay. As demonstrated in this article, non-recourse mortgage regulation creates a moral hazard problem and enables borrowers to externalize the risks of default
to third parties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the role played by non-recourse mortgages in creating
the conditions that triggered the recent global financial crisis. The effect of non-recourse mortgages, in conjunction with the elimination of down payment requirements, was a distortion of risk allocation in the US mortgage market. When borrowers are not required to invest anything upfront in order to get a mortgage and bear no
personal liability for repayment in the event of default, they are not deterred from
taking out loans beyond their means. Quite the contrary: this only incentivized excessive borrowing, increased the demand for real estate assets, and led to the housing
boom and bust.
The analysis of the incentive distortions created by non-recourse mortgages has
144. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b.
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e.
146. 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 64 (S.B. 1069) (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b).
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important implications for the recent regulatory reforms in the US mortgage market.
The borrower-friendly state legislation enacted in the wake of the mortgage meltdown that expanded the scope of non-recourse mortgages failed to give proper weight
to the negative long-term implications of this regulation, such as distorted incentives
for excessive borrowing. Regulators should take heed of the insights from the analysis here and beware of overestimating the short-term benefits of the regulation and of
underestimating its long-term costs.
From a broader perspective, the discussion in this article illustrates how regulation that was enacted as a reaction to a severe economic crisis (the Great Depression)
not only failed to prevent a large-scale future crisis (the Great Recession), but also
laid the groundwork for the emergence of the latter. This represents a novel approach
in the academic research on the causes of the recent global financial crisis, where the
common assumption is that deregulation was to blame for the crisis.
And yet despite the article’s criticism of the regulatory practices in the wake of
economic crises, it does not object to regulation per se. At the base of the article is
the premise that regulation is an important tool in modern economies. The intention
here has been to point out the risks created by the atmosphere of public fear and
distrust that follows a serious financial crisis, which can lead the regulatory authorities to hurriedly push through regulation without sufficiently evaluating its potential
impact. The approach advocated in this article is a forward-looking regulatory process that takes into account the full range of possible outcomes of the regulation rather than the need for a quick regulatory response to appease public outrage. To be
sure, the risk that regulatory intervention could cause serious damage in the future
should not deter regulators from acting. A regulatory process that includes a thorough
review and investigation of possible future impacts of the proposed measures should
enable regulators to identify the built-in risks of the regulation and either neutralize
them in advance or at least minimize their impact as much as possible.

